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Jewish Survival, Divine Supervision, 
and the Existence of God 
Moti Mizrahi 
St. John’s University
In this paper, I discuss an argument for the existence of God known as “The Ar-
gument from the Survival of the Jews.” This argument has the form of an Infer-
ence to the Best Explanation (IBE). It proceeds from the phenomenon of Jewish 
survival to the existence of God as the best explanation for this phenomenon. I 
will argue that, even if we grant that Jewish survival is a remarkable occurrence 
that demands an explanation, and even if we gloss over the difficulties in defining 
the terms “Jewish” and “survive,” the argument ultimately fails as an argument for 
the existence of God. It fails because it postulates divine supervision in order to 
explain Jewish endurance, but it doesn’t provide any clues as to what might be 
the underlying mechanism at work.
1. The Argument from the Survival of the Jews 
In Permission to Believe, Rabbi Lawrence Kelemen discusses what he calls “The 
Jewish History Approach to God’s Existence.” He raises the following ques-
tion: “How did the Jews survive to enjoy the success they have?”1 He claims that 
this is a question that has perplexed historians. He also claims that the usual 
explanations offered as responses to this question are inadequate. He then 
argues that the best explanation for Jewish endurance is divine supervision. 
That is to say, the Jews survived hardships and endured for so long, unlike 
other ancient peoples, because God is protecting them. As Kelemen writes:
1Lawrence Kelemen, Permission to Believe: Four Rational Approaches to God’s Existence 
(Southfield, Michigan: Targum Press, 1990; Third Revised Edition 1991), p. 70, original 
emphasis. Rabbi Kelemen is a Professor of Education at Neve Yerushalayim, the Jerusalem 
College for Jewish Women’s Studies. For more information about Kelemen, see his website 
http://www.lawrencekelemen.com.  
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We feebly struggle to explain Jewish survival in secular terms: Maybe it is be-
cause they were poor? Maybe it is because they were rich? Maybe it is because 
they were pacifists? Maybe it is because they fought back? Maybe it is because 
they were concentrated? Maybe it is because they were scattered? But we know 
that other peoples shared these characteristics and are gone. The question 
stands: Why did only the Jews survive? The theological solution is attractive.2
The “theological solution,” according to Kelemen is divine supervision. 
A similar sense of puzzlement can be found in Mark Twain’s “Concerning 
the Jews.” According to Twain: 
[The Jew] has made a marvelous fight in this world, in all the ages; and has done 
it with his hands tied behind him. He could be vain of himself, and be excused 
for it. The Egyptian, the Babylonian, and the Persian rose, filled the planet with 
sound and splendor, then faded to dream-stuff and passed away; the Greek and 
the Roman followed, and made a vast noise, and they are gone; other peoples 
have sprung up and held their torch high for a time, but it burned out, and they 
sit in twilight now, or have vanished. The Jew saw them all, beat them all, and 
is now what he always was, exhibiting no decadence, no infirmities of age, no 
weakening of his parts, no slowing of his energies, no dulling of his alert and 
aggressive mind. All things are mortal but the Jew; all other forces pass, but he 
remains. What is the secret of his immortality?3
For Kelemen, then, given that divine supervision is the best explanation of 
Jewish survival, this provides one with a good reason to believe in the existence 
of God.4
In this paper, I am concerned with this argument for the existence of God 
rather than with Kelemen himself or his theology. However, since Kelemen 
may not be well known in academic circles, perhaps another, more recent ex-
ample of a scholar who discusses a similar argument would be useful. In 36 
Arguments for the Existence of God: A Work of Fiction, Rebecca Goldstein dis-
cusses an argument she calls “The Argument from the Survival of the Jews.” 
Although this is a work of fiction, as the title says, Goldstein offers the follow-
ing reconstruction in the Appendix: 
1. The Jews introduced the world to the idea of the one God, with his 
universal moral code. 
2Kelemen, Permission to Believe, p. 84.
3Mark Twain, “Concerning the Jews,” Harper’s Magazine (1898). Available at http://
www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1898twain-jews.html. 
4See also I. Jakobovits, “Faith, Ethics, and the Holocaust: Some Personal Theological 
and Religious Responses to the Holocaust,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Vol. 3 (1988): 
371–381.
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2. The survival of the Jews, living for millennia without a country of their 
own, and facing a multitude of enemies that sought to destroy not 
only their religion but all remnants of the race, is a historical unlikeli-
hood. 
3. The Jews have survived against vast odds (from 2). 
4. There is no natural explanation for so unlikely an event as the survival 
of the Jews (from 3). 
5. The best explanation is that they have some transcendent purpose to 
play in human destiny (from 1 and 4). 
6. Only God could have assigned a transcendent destiny to the Jews. 
7. God exists.5 
Like Kelemen’s argument from Jewish history, this argument is also an 
Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). In what follows, then, I will evaluate 
the Argument from the Survival of the Jews based on criteria of selection com-
monly accepted in the case of IBE. I will argue that the Argument from the 
Survival of the Jews ultimately fails as an argument for the existence of God, 
but for reasons that may not be so obvious. 
In addition to the intellectual merits of discussing arguments for and 
against the existence of God, I think there is another reason why the Argu-
ment from the Survival of the Jews deserves close examination. It seems to me 
that understanding divine providence is crucial for making sense of two basic 
tenets of Judaism.6 The first is that a special relationship between God and the 
Jewish people was established at the moment God chose them as his treasured 
people.7 The second is that divine supervision is operative not only at the level 
of the collective, i.e., the Jewish people, but also at the level of the individual. 
This is known as Hashgacha pratit or divine supervision of the individual.8 To 
make sense of these two tenets, it seems to me, we have to be able to make 
5Rebecca N. Goldstein, 36 Arguments for the Existence of God: A Work of Fiction (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 2010), p. 383.
6According to M. Kellner, Must a Jew Believe Anything? (Oxford: Littman Library of 
Jewish Studies, 1999), chap. 1, the Torah teaches to believe in God and in divine provi-
dence. 
7See, e.g., Deuteronomy 14:2. “For thou art a holy people unto the Lord thy God, and 
the Lord hath chosen thee to be His own treasure out of all peoples that are upon the face 
of the earth.” 
8See, e.g., Proverbs 3:26. “For the Lord shall be at your side, he will keep your foot 
from capture.” Quoted in P. B. Overland, “Shoah in the World of the Sages,” Shofar: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies, Vol. 23 (2005): 9–18. 
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sense of the mechanism of divine supervision at work. I will argue that we 
don’t have a clear sense of what that mechanism might be at the collective 
level. If this is correct, then there seems to be no reason to think that we have a 
clearer sense of what that mechanism might be at the individual level.9
Before I begin, however, it is important to note that Goldstein does not 
endorse the Argument from the Survival of the Jews. Indeed, Goldstein points 
out the following flaw in the argument:
The fact that Jews, after the destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans, 
had no country of their own, made it more likely, rather than less likely, that they 
would survive as a people. If they had been concentrated in one country, they 
would surely have been conquered by one of history’s great empires, as happened 
to other vanished tribes. But a people dispersed across a vast diaspora is more 
resilient, which is why other stateless peoples, like the Parsis and Roma (Gyp-
sies), have also survived for millennia, often against harrowing odds. Moreover, 
the Jews encouraged cultural traits—such as literacy, urban living, specialization 
in middleman occupations, and an extensive legal code to govern their internal 
affairs—that gave them further resilience against the vicissitudes of historical 
change. The survival of the Jews, therefore, is not a miraculous improbability.10
And then she adds the following comment: 
The persecution of the Jews need not be seen as part of a cosmic moral drama. 
The unique role that Judaism played in disseminating monotheism, mostly 
through the organs of its two far more popular monotheistic offshoots, Chris-
tianity and Islam, has bequeathed to its adherents an unusual amount of atten-
tion, mostly negative, from adherents of those other monotheistic religions.11 
I will revisit these comments below, although I will point to other reasons why 
the Argument from the Survival of the Jews ultimately fails as an argument for 
the existence of God, reasons having to do with the fact that it is supposed to 
be an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). So, first, I will say a few words 
about the structure of IBE.
9In addition, one often hears a version of the Argument from the Survival of the Jews 
used by rabbis, such as Amnon Yitzchak and others, in “spiritual improvement and repen-
tance seminars” (baal teshuva), especially in Israel. So it is important to evaluate this argu-
ment in order to see how successful it really is.
10Goldstein, 36 Arguments, p. 383, emphasis in original.
11Goldstein, 36 Arguments, p. 384.
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2. Inference to the Best Explanation 
It seems that the Argument from the Survival of the Jews is intended to be an 
Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). Gilbert Harman defines this form of 
non-deductive reasoning as inference “from the premise that a given hypoth-
esis would provide a ‘better’ explanation for the evidence than would any other 
hypothesis, to the conclusion that the given hypothesis is true.”12 The form of 
IBE, then, is the following: 
(IBE) Phenomenon P.
The best explanation for P is E. 
Therefore, (probably) E. 
Accordingly, the Argument from the Survival of the Jews can be reconstructed 
as follows: 
( J1) The Jewish people survived numerous hardships. 
( J2) The best explanation for ( J1) is that the Jews enjoy special divine 
supervision. 
( J3) Therefore, (probably) the Jews are protected by God. 
As in any other argument of the form IBE, the obvious question is what makes 
the explanation offered the “best” explanation? What are the criteria by which 
we judge one explanation to be better than all the rest? For present purposes, 
then, the question is what makes divine supervision the best explanation for 
Jewish survival. In other words, the crucial premise in the Argument from the 
Survival of the Jews is premise ( J2) or premise (5) in Goldstein’s reconstruction. 
Arguing for the existence of God as the best explanation for a certain 
phenomenon may not be novel or original. One might reasonably construe 
Descartes’ argument for the existence of God in the Meditations on First Phi-
losophy (1641), for instance, as an inference to the best explanation. In the 
Third Meditation, Descartes seems to argue as follows:
(D1) He has an idea of God, where God is understood as “a certain sub-
stance that is infinite, independent, supremely intelligent and su-
premely powerful, that created [him] along with everything else that 
exists.”13 
12Gilbert H. Harman, “The Inference to the Best Explanation,” The Philosophical Re-
view, Vol. 74 (1965): 89.
13René Descartes, Philosophical Essays and Correspondence, ed. Roger Ariew (India-
napolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2000),  p. 175.
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(D2) The best (perhaps even the only) explanation for the existence of 
this idea is that it is ultimately caused by God himself. 
(D3) Therefore, God is the cause of his idea of God.14 
If this reconstruction of Descartes’ argument for the existence of God in the 
Third Mediation is correct, then perhaps the Argument from the Survival of 
the Jews is not original in its form. But its content, on the other hand, intro-
duces a unique remarkable phenomenon, i.e., the survival of the Jewish people, 
which requires an explanation that invokes the divine.
Accordingly, one might wonder whether or not the survival of the Jewish 
people is indeed a remarkable occurrence that demands such an explanation. 
It seems that one might reasonably ask why the survival of the Jewish people 
is more remarkable than that of, say, the Zoroastrians. This, in turn, points 
to another question about the way in which the term “Jewish” is used in this 
argument. What makes a person Jewish? This is, of course, a difficult question 
that is well beyond the scope of this paper.15 But notice that if by “Jewish” we 
mean “a person who is practicing Judaism (i.e., the religion),” then the survival 
of the Jewish people might seem no more remarkable, and hence no more in 
need of explanation, let alone a supernatural explanation, then the survival of 
practitioners of Zoroastrianism. Arguably, the religious persecution of Zoro-
astrians was just as significant to the formation of their group identity as that 
of the Jews. 
Another, related problem with the Argument from the Survival of the 
Jews is that it is not clear what is meant by “survival,” and who or what sur-
vives exactly. This problem becomes especially acute if “Jew” is interpreted as 
“a practitioner of Judaism.” For, in that case, it doesn’t seem very remarkable, 
and hence in need of explanation, that Jewish practices, customs, and beliefs 
have survived for so long. Throughout history, various practices and beliefs 
have been abandoned and then taken up again by later generations. If premise 
( J1)—or premise (3) in Goldstein’s reconstruction—is the claim that the Jew-
ish religion has survived, then that doesn’t seem like a riddle or a miraculous 
improbability that needs to be explained by invoking the divine, at least no 
more than the survival of Zoroastrianism does. 
14For a similar reconstruction, see L. Bonjour, Epistemology: Classic Problems and Con-
temporary Responses (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), pp. 17–18.
15See, e.g., M. N. Kertzer, What is a Jew?, revised by Lawrence A. Hoffman (New 
York: Touchstone, 1996) and J. Kugel, On Being a Jew (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1998).
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In Kelemen’s version of the Argument from the Survival of the Jews, the 
quotations he provides to support his claim that historians are perplexed by 
the riddle of Jewish survival do not seem to make it any clearer who or what 
is surviving thanks to God’s protection. For example, Kelemen cites Henry 
Bamford Parkes, who writes: 
But while a historical account illuminates the development of Jewish monothe-
ism, it does not wholly explain it; other Near Eastern peoples were confronted 
by similar problems, but failed to make any comparable response.16 
By “Jewish monotheism,” Parkes seems to mean the Jewish faith or reli-
gion, whose development can be explained by historical accounts. But then he 
switches to talking about peoples, rather than religions, and says that other 
peoples of the region dealt with problems similar to those the Jewish people 
faced but in different ways. In any case, it seems that Parkes himself is reluc-
tant to endorse a supernatural explanation for the survival of the Jews, for he 
goes on to say that “[b]y rationalistic standards Jehovah must, of course, be 
regarded as a projection of the Jewish imagination.”17 
3. Alternative Explanations 
For the sake of argument, however, let us grant premise ( J1)—or premise 
(3) in Goldstein’s reconstruction—and accept that the survival of the Jewish 
people is an unusual improbability that demands an explanation. Now we can 
return to the question raised above, namely, are there any alternative explana-
tions for the phenomenon of Jewish survival? That is to say, can we explain 
why the Jewish people endured for so long without appealing to divine su-
pervision? Kelemen seems to admit that there are alternative explanations in 
the quotation above, but he doesn’t find them satisfactory. In fact, he seems to 
suggest that secular explanations in general fall short of explaining the riddle 
of Jewish survival. As Kelemen writes:
The Jews can explain why the Jewish people has suffered; it is now incumbent 
upon humanity to explain why the Jewish people has survived. And one who feels 
dissatisfied with the non-religious responses to the riddle of Jewish endurance 
can certainly find in the history of this unusual people permission to believe.18 
16Henry Bamford Parkes, Gods and Men: The Origins of Western Culture (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1959), p. 86. 
17Parkes, Gods and Men, p. 86.
18Kelemen, Permission to Believe, p. 86.
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Similarly, Goldstein’s reconstruction of the Argument from the Survival of the 
Jews includes an explicit claim about the inability of natural explanations to 
account for the survival of the Jews, i.e., premise (4).
As there are several kinds of explanations, such as nomic and functional 
explanations, it is important to note that the explanation the Argument from 
the Survival of the Jews is calling for is supposed to be a causal explanation.19 
That is to say, the statement “The Jews endure because they are protected by 
God,” should be understood as a causal claim. God is the cause of the Jews’ 
survival in a sense that is similar to the one in which a certain virus is a cause 
for a particular disease. In that respect, there must be a causal mechanism un-
derlying the divine protection of the Jews just as there is a causal mechanism 
underlying the spread of disease by viruses. We will return to this question in 
Section Four where we discuss the criteria for selecting the best explanation 
and whether or not divine supervision meets these criteria as an explanation 
for the survival of the Jewish people. 
Now, if alternative explanations to the riddle of Jewish endurance cannot 
be eliminated, but rather are rejected as unlikely, then the Argument from the 
Survival of the Jews is not intended to be what Alexander Bird calls “infer-
ence to the only explanation” (IOE).20 In the case of IOE, there is sufficient 
evidence to refute all explanations except one. According to Bird, IOE has the 
following structure:
The fact es has an explanation. 
h1, …, hn are the only hypotheses that could explain es. 
h1, …, hn–1 have been falsified by the evidence. 
Therefore, hn explains es.21
The Argument from the Survival of the Jews doesn’t seem to have the struc-
ture of IOE because the alternative explanations (or hypotheses) for the riddle 
of Jewish survival were not falsified by the evidence, but rather rejected as 
unlikely. For example, Kelemen hints at the fact that the Jewish people were 
scattered in several places around the world as an explanation for their endur-
ance. This is also the explanation Goldstein provides in the comments quoted 
19For a discussion of different kinds of explanation, see A. Bird, Philosophy of Science 
(Montreal: McGill Queen’s University Press, 1998). 
20A. Bird, “Inference to the Only Explanation,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search, Vol. 74 (2007): 424–432. See also A. Bird, “Eliminative Abduction—Examples 
from Medicine,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (2009). 
21Bird, “Eliminative Abduction.”
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above. According to Goldstein, a major flaw in the Argument from the Sur-
vival of the Jews is that being stateless and scattered may have actually been 
conducive rather than detrimental to Jewish survival. This alternative explana-
tion is not falsified by the evidence. That is to say, there is no evidence that 
refutes this alternative explanation or that would force us to eliminate it from 
the list of likely explanations.22
4. The Best Explanation 
If the aforementioned considerations are correct, then it seems that the Argu-
ment from the Survival of the Jews is supposed to be an IBE, rather than an 
IOE, and thus we need to be able to say what makes the divine supervision 
explanation better than all the alternative explanations. 
What makes an explanation “the best”? Philosophers have proposed sev-
eral criteria of selection. These include the following:
Coherence: As a general rule of thumb, choose the explanation that is con-
sistent with expert judgments within the domain in question. 
Power: As a general rule of thumb, choose the explanation that explains 
the most and leaves the fewest things unexplained. 
Simplicity: As a general rule of thumb, choose the least complicated expla-
nation, i.e., the one that posits the least causal sequences and entities, and that 
goes beyond the evidence the least. 
Testability: As a general rule of thumb, choose the explanation that yields 
predictions that can be tested independently.23
Judged by these criteria of selection, it might appear as if the divine supervi-
sion explanation for Jewish survival fails in terms of testability, as it doesn’t 
seem to yield any predictions that can be tested independently. However, I 
22According to Rabbi Judah Halevi (The Kuzari: An Argument for the Faith of Israel, 
trans. Hartwig Hirschfeld [New York: Schocken Books, 1964], pp. 226–227), on the one 
hand, the exile and dispersion of the Jews was punishment for their sins. On the other 
hand, however, it also ensured that Judaism—the true monotheistic faith—would have ad-
herents all over the world. See also M. Walzer, “Nation and Universe,” The Tanner Lectures 
on Human Values (Oxford University, May 1989). Available at http://www.tannerlectures.
utah.edu/lectures/documents/walzer90.pdf.
23See, e.g., P. Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 
2004), who talks about explanations in terms of their “loveliness.” 
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think that the divine supervision explanation can be independently tested, 
provided that we make a few assumptions about the nature of God. 
For example, given certain auxiliary assumptions about the nature of 
God, which are accepted by Judaism as well as other monotheistic religions, 
we would expect humans to be created fairly soon after the creation of the uni-
verse. It would seem rather odd to create a universe eons before the creation 
of the species that is supposed to play a central role in it. If humanity does 
indeed provide the rationale for the existence of the rest of creation, then we 
would expect humans to arrive on the scene relatively soon after the creation 
of the universe. But we would also expect some plants and animals to be cre-
ated before humans. If plants and animals were created for human use, e.g., as 
a source of food and clothing, then it would be unwise to create humans before 
creating at least some plants and animals for their use. On the other hand, 
we would not expect humans to be created very long after the first plants and 
animals. For, then, what would be the point of having plants and animals for 
human pleasure, without any humans around to actually make use of them?24 
Furthermore, if the Jews are indeed the chosen people, then we would expect 
them to arrive on the scene early in the history of the world. For what would 
be the point of creation without God’s chosen people?
If it doesn’t fail in terms of testability, perhaps the divine supervision ex-
planation for Jewish survival fails in terms of simplicity, for it seems to go 
beyond the evidence and posits an unobserved (even unobservable) entity to 
account for an observable phenomenon. Ockham’s razor dictates that we must 
not multiply entities beyond necessity, or so one might argue. However, I think 
that divine supervision doesn’t fail as an explanation in that respect. In other 
words, it is not guilty of going beyond the evidence and postulating the exis-
tence of unobservable entities, at least no more than any other explanation 
does. To see why, consider an example from science. Alfred Wegener noticed 
that some coastlines, like those of South America and Africa, look as though 
they would fit together like puzzle pieces. He also learned that related species, 
as well as similar fossils, were found on different continents. 
In light of this evidence, Wegener proposed that the continents were once 
attached in a single landmass he called “Pangaea.” According to Wegener, the 
continents were surrounded by one global ocean, but then broke apart and 
somehow drifted away. Wegener’s theory of continental drift seemed to ex-
plain the observable evidence: the shape of the continents, the fossil evidence, 
24See N. Everitt, The Non-existence of God (London: Routledge, 2004), Chap. 11.
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the matching rock types and geologic structures, and the evidence of ancient 
climate patterns. But there was one major problem: Wegener could not come 
up with an acceptable way to explain how the continents moved.25
As a result, few of Wegener’s contemporaries accepted his theory in his 
lifetime. Only after Wegener’s death did Arthur Holmes publish his work on 
thermal convection in the earth’s mantle and how this could be the mecha-
nism that explains how the continents could move. Holmes suggested that the 
continents were “carried” by larger pieces of the earth’s crust. Subsequently, the 
discovery of the Mid-Ocean Ridge and the work of Harry Hess and others 
led to the development of plate tectonics. This example illustrates that there 
is nothing wrong with postulating unobserved entities to explain observ-
able phenomena as such. Wegener postulated the existence of Pangaea and 
the process of continental drift to explain observable evidence relating to the 
shape of the continents. Similarly, one might think that a certain phenomenon 
is so remarkable and improbable that it requires an appeal to the divine for an 
explanation. 
However, when one proposes a causal explanation of this sort, one must 
be able to describe the mechanism that underlies the causal sequences. This 
is why the Wegener example is instructive, for it seems to point to the rea-
son why the divine supervision explanation is ultimately unsatisfactory. As we 
have seen, Wegener’s theory of continental drift was met with skepticism and 
opposition largely because Wegener didn’t have a mechanism by which to ex-
plain how the continents move. Lacking such a mechanism, it was difficult for 
his contemporaries to imagine how the continents could move. The divine su-
pervision explanation, I propose, suffers from the same problem. It’s not clear 
what the mechanism of defense is, as it were, by means of which God protects 
the Jewish people. Does God put a protective dome over every Jewish person? 
Does God intervene every time a Jew is in trouble? Perhaps God protects only 
some of the Jews, but not all of them. In that case, how many Jews should be 
alive and well at each point in time for God to be satisfied? And if by ‘Jewish’ 
we simply mean “a practitioner of Judaism,” then what happens when a Jewish 
person stops practicing Judaism? Does God stop protecting that person? Or 
what happens when someone converts to Judaism? Does God keep tabs on 
conversions? If so, how? 
25See, H. E. Le Grand, Drifting Continents and Shifting Theories (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1994).
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It seems clear, then, that the divine supervision explanation raises many 
questions about the mechanism by means of which God is supposed to be 
protecting the Jewish people. In that respect, this explanation seems to fail in 
terms of Power; it leaves a lot of loose ends, and it raises more questions than 
it provides answers. 
At this point, it might appear as if Goldstein’s version of the Argument 
from the Survival of the Jews is superior to Kelemen’s version, for it doesn’t 
seem to require a divine protection mechanism. Instead, it simply says that 
God has assigned a destiny to the Jews, and thus that the Jews have a pur-
pose to play in human destiny. Although it doesn’t explicitly postulate a divine 
protection mechanism, however, Goldstein’s version of the Argument from 
the Survival of the Jews still needs one. In other words, the postulation of the 
divine protection mechanism may be implicit in the argument, but it is still 
there, and the argument would not work without it. To see why, consider the 
following questions:
Assuming that God assigned a transcendent destiny to the Jews, 
♦ How does God make sure that the Jews meet their destiny? 
♦ What does God do when the Jews are not playing their proper role in 
human destiny? 
♦ What does God do when the Jews are not fulfilling their purpose? 
♦ What does God do when this purpose is at risk of not being fulfilled? 
♦ What does God do when the Jews, and hence their destiny, are in danger?
The point, then, is that for the Jews to act the role assigned to them by 
God, God has to make sure that they do so and that nothing will prevent the 
Jews from meeting their destiny. If this is correct, then even in Goldstein’s ver-
sion of the Argument from the Survival of the Jews, one must also postulate a 
mechanism of divine supervision. And if that’s the case, then all the questions 
about that mechanism mentioned above may still be raised.
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I discussed an argument for the existence of God that deserves 
attention and careful analysis, or so I think. This argument has the form of 
an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). It proceeds from the phenom-
enon of Jewish survival to the existence of God as the best explanation for this 
phenomenon. However, as I argued, even if we grant that Jewish survival is a 
remarkable occurrence that demands an explanation, and even if we gloss over 
the difficulties in defining the terms “Jewish” and “survive,” it seems that the 
Argument from the Survival of the Jews ultimately fails as an argument for 
the existence of God. It fails because it postulates divine supervision in order 
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to explain Jewish survival, but it doesn’t provide any clues as to what might be 
the underlying mechanism at work. 
This failure, however, may not be terminal. For recall that Wegener’s the-
ory of continental drift initially raised many questions, including the question 
about the mechanism of drift. But later researches addressed these questions 
and proposed such a mechanism. Similarly, it might be possible to articulate 
a mechanism of divine protection as well. In other words, those who find the 
divine supervision explanation to be the best explanation for the riddle of 
Jewish survival must provide answers to the questions about that mechanism 
mentioned above. Admittedly, it is difficult to imagine evidence that would 
support this, i.e., evidence that would make answers to these questions plau-
sible or likely rather than merely conceptually coherent. Nevertheless, it seems 
there is no reason to suppose that these questions cannot be answered in prin-
ciple. Until we have answers to these questions, however, we seem to be justi-
fied in suspending judgment just as Wegener’s contemporaries were. In other 
words, the Argument from the Survival of the Jews doesn’t seem to give us 
“permission to believe,” at least not in its current form.
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